



Universal Truth Framework

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Universal Truth Framework – What?

Every **claim** made by framework is **verifiably true**!

- Claims come with independent, succinct, 3rd party checkable proof certificates

Claim = anything provable or computable:
program execution, work done or action,
formal correctness or security of code,
... mathematical theorem



Universal Truth Framework – So What?

Many Many Applications ... Sky's the Limit

Verifiable computing for *all* programming languages

- Execute your code securely in untrusted environments (e.g., in the cloud)

zkLANG for *any* programming language LANG, correct by construction

- zkEVM variants, Cairo (StarkWare), zkVM (RiscZero), zkLLVM (=nil; Foundation)

Formal verification, correctness, security audits, any other program claims, all become checkable certificates (instead of PDFs)

- You don't have to trust the developers or the auditors or anybody else

Critical procedures or devices (medical, aviation, automotive, robotics, blockchains) yield checkable certificates for their correct application




- Increase confidence in complex systems, complex processes, machines, AI

Universal Truth Framework – How?

K + SNARKS = Marriage Made in Heaven

Claim:

φ




Huge!
GBs or TBs

mathematical
proof checker
(240 LOC)



SNARK-ed!



256 bits

Can use other provers (Coq, Lean, Isabelle, Agda, Dedukti, etc.) or even AI (ChatGPT) to search for proofs

Universal Truth Framework – New Blockchain Tech? Blockchain of Truth!

Blockchains currently suffer from some limitations:

- Duplication of computation (all nodes execute same code)
- Hardwired programming or VM language, for all programs
- Security, correctness, formal verification are “external” activities, off-chain

Will enable new generation of blockchains - Blockchain of Truth


- Allow arbitrary claims to be made, stored, checked; e.g. executions, correctness
- Write smart contracts in any programming or specification language
- Execute transaction code once and for all, locally; send SNARK certificate
- Any claim is backed by a mathematical proof, made succinct as a crypto proof



What is K and Why?

kframework.org

State of the Art: (too) Many Languages, Many Tools




Execution, VMs, Testing
e.g.: `factorial(3) = 6`

Optimizers, Bugs, MEV
e.g.: `MEV(txs) = 17`

Formal verifiers
e.g.: `0x2e...f5 | = ERC20`

Pain Points:

Duplication, Errors, and Many Claims to Trust!



Execution, VMs, Testing
e.g.: `factorial(3) = 6`

Optimizers, Bugs, MEV
e.g.: `mev(txs) = 17`


Formal verifiers
e.g.: `0x2e...f5 | = erc20`

- Duplication of code and effort
- Wasted talent, error prone, out of sync

Claims: Functional, Safety, Security)
Blockchain tech falls here ^^^

Our Solution: K

Invented in 2003, Improved Ever Since



- + Separation of concerns
- + Intrinsic network effect

$\Gamma_{Lang} \vdash \varphi_{task}$

Execution, VMs, Testing
e.g.: `factorial(3) = 6`

Optimizers, Bugs, MEV
e.g.: `mev(txs) = 17`


Formal verifiers
e.g.: `0x2e...f5 | = erc20`

Everything in K is a proof, $\Gamma_{Lang} \vdash \varphi_{task}$
Computation is a special case of proof
Small(est) proof checker: 240 LOC

K is Large and Complex – Why Trust It? You Shouldn't! Check The Proofs It Outputs!

500k+ lines of code, 4 different languages
Likely most complex formal methods system

Open source:
kframework.org



What's New in K?


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K Summarizer

Input: PL semantics, say KEVM, and code fragment, say **SumContract**

```
contract SumContract {  
    function sum(int n) external pure returns (int s) {  
        s = 1;  
        int i = n;  
        while (i > 1) {  
            s += i;  
            i -= 1;  
        }  
    }  
}
```

Output: A CFG comprising all symbolic behaviors of the program.
Semantics driven, correct by construction: each edge is a proved claim.



Not possible 6 months ago! Game changer.

KFoundry = K[EVM] + Cheat Codes

Foundry is an increasingly popular parametric property testing framework for Solidity

```
contract ContractTest is Test {  
  
    SumContract cut;  
  
    function setUp() public {  
        cut = new SumContract();  
    }  
  
    function testSumProperty(int N) public {  
        vm.assume(N >= 0); // vm.assume(N < 10);  
        int r = cut.sum(N);  
        assertEq(r, N * (N + 1) / 2);  
    }  
}
```

Starting from blank state, execute setUp, then save that state. Deploy any contracts needed, mint balances, etc...


From the state post setUp, execute each test* method with random inputs for the arguments.



Foundry tools generate random inputs for parameters and run the resulting tests.

KFoundry executes the parametric tests symbolically, using the K EVM semantics.

Parametric tests become formal specifications, and KFoundry formally verifies them!



Familiar UI. K hidden under the hood!

Formal Verification with Parametric Tests

Hoare Triples – foundation of formal verification:

```
(forall vars)
  {pre} code {post}
```

They can be expressed as property tests:

```
function testProperty(vars) {
  assume pre;
  code;
  assert post;
}
```

Passing property test symbolically = formal verification of Hoare triple !

Most of formal verification is symbolic property testing!

Example (Solidity sum of numbers up to N):

```
(forall N)
  {N > 0} r = sum(N) {r = N*(N+1)/2}
```

expressible as property test:

```
function testSumProperty(int N) public {
  vm.assume(N > 0);
  int r = cut.sum(N);
  assertEq(r, N * (N + 1) / 2);
}
```

ERC-X Tool = KFoundry[ERC token specification]

ercx.runtimeverification.com

Deep dive investigation of ERC tokens deployed on mainnet.

Check any token's conformance with the ERC standards, before or after deployment on mainnet.

For ERC20, we check properties of state variables, behaviors of transfers and approvals, contract balance, expected event emissions, and usage of the zero address.

ERCx requires your contract to be **deployed**. Provide its address as shown on etherscan.io.

0x...

				7						X
X				7	2	1				
	2			7		1		4		
	0					5		6		
			X			5		2		
X								6		

Completely Automatic!

Submit your token, too. See how you stack up!

RV-Match = K[C]

Used for Verification of Solana Validator

Funded by:



```
typedef unsigned short ushort;
static inline ushort fd_ushort_rotate_right(ushort x, int n) {
    n &= 15;
    return (ushort)((x >> n) | (x << (16 - n)));
}

int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    ushort i = fd_ushort_rotate_right(60164, 0);
    return 0;
}
```

fire dancer snippet

RV-Match:

- Instance of K concrete execution with C lang
- Automatic debugger for subtle bugs other tools can't find, with no false positives
- Seamless integration with unit tests, build infrastructure, and continuous integration
- Platform for analyzing programs, boosting standards compliance and assurance

Conventional compilers do not detect problem

```
$ gcc fd_ub_example.c -o gcc.out
$ ./gcc.out
$
$ kcc fd_ub_example.c -o kcc.out
$ ./kcc.out
fd_ub_example.c: In function `fd_ushort_rotate_right':
fd_ub_example.c:6:3: error: undefined behavior: result of signed left shift not representable in result type [-Wno-signed-left-shift-overflow]
    Refer to c18 §6.5.7/4 file:///src/.build/dist/lib/kcc/html/shifts.html
called by fd_ub_example.c:10:14(main)
```

RV-Match's kcc tool precisely detects and reports error, and points to ISO C11 standard

Most comprehensive C semantics! ISO compliant.



Matching Logic Proof Objects SNARKed Proof Checker

Matching Logic = Foundation for K, Coq, Lean, ...

Smallest logical foundation known for languages and formal verification!

- Invented in 2019 [published in LICS'19]
- 7 syntactic constructs, 15 proof rules
- Can define *any programming language (PL)*
- Can express *any claim about any program*

Everything K, Coq, Lean, etc., do is a provable matching logic theorem $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$

- Thus, K, Coq, Lean, ..., become powerful *methodologies* to build ML proofs [ICFP'20]
- We prefer K: computation = proof, fast (can be used as PL), many PLs formalized

FOL Rules	(Propositional 1)	$\varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$
	(Propositional 2)	$(\varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \theta)) \rightarrow ((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \theta))$
	(Propositional 3)	$((\varphi \rightarrow \perp) \rightarrow \perp) \rightarrow \varphi$
	(Modus Ponens)	$\frac{\varphi \quad \varphi \rightarrow \psi}{\psi}$
	(\exists -Quantifier)	$\frac{\varphi[y/x]}{\varphi[y/x] \rightarrow \exists x. \varphi}$
(\exists -Generalization)	$\frac{\varphi \rightarrow \psi}{(\exists x. \varphi) \rightarrow \psi} \quad x \notin FV(\psi)$	
Frame Rules	(Propagation $_{\perp}$)	$C[\perp] \rightarrow \perp$
	(Propagation $_{\vee}$)	$C[\varphi \vee \psi] \rightarrow C[\varphi] \vee C[\psi]$
	(Propagation $_{\exists}$)	$C[\exists x. \varphi] \rightarrow \exists x. C[\varphi] \text{ with } x \notin FV(C)$
	(Framing)	$\frac{\varphi \rightarrow \psi}{C[\varphi] \rightarrow C[\psi]}$
Fixpoint Rules	(Substitution)	$\frac{\varphi}{\varphi[\psi/X]}$
	(Prefixpoint)	$\varphi[(\mu X. \varphi)/X] \rightarrow \mu X. \varphi$
	(Knaster-Tarski)	$\frac{\varphi[\psi/X] \rightarrow \psi}{(\mu X. \varphi) \rightarrow \psi}$
Technical Rules	(Existence)	$\exists x. x$
	(Singleton)	$\neg(C_1[x \wedge \varphi] \wedge C_2[x \wedge \neg\varphi])$

240 LOC Proof Checker – Smallest Ever!

We use MetaMath

- metamath.org; 20+ implementations
- Defined entire matching logic
- Encode claims and proof objects
- Reduce claim correctness to mathematical proof checking: $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$

axioms theorem

[published in CAV'21, OOPSLA'23]

```
1  $c \imp ( ) #Pattern |- $.
2
3  $v ph1 ph2 ph3 $.
4  ph1-is-pattern $f #Pattern ph1 $.
5  ph2-is-pattern $f #Pattern ph2 $.
6  ph3-is-pattern $f #Pattern ph3 $.
7  imp-is-pattern
8    $a #Pattern ( \imp ph1 ph2 ) $.
9
10 axiom-1
11   $a |- ( \imp ph1 ( \imp ph2 ph1 ) ) $.
12
13 axiom-2
14   $a |- ( \imp ( \imp ph1 ( \imp ph2 ph3 ) )
15           ( \imp ( \imp ph1 ph2 )
16                   ( \imp ph1 ph3 ) ) ) $.
17
18 ${
19   rule-mp.0 $e |- ( \imp ph1 ph2 ) $.
20   rule-mp.1 $e |- ph1 $.
21   rule-mp   $a |- ph2 $.
22 }
```

Matching logic syntax
and proof system
(240 LOC in total)

```
23  imp-refl $p |- ( \imp ph1 ph1 )
24  $=
25    ph1-is-pattern ph1-is-pattern
26    ph1-is-pattern imp-is-pattern
27    imp-is-pattern ph1-is-pattern
28    ph1-is-pattern imp-is-pattern
29    ph1-is-pattern ph1-is-pattern
30    ph1-is-pattern imp-is-pattern
31    ph1-is-pattern imp-is-pattern
32    imp-is-pattern ph1-is-pattern
33    ph1-is-pattern ph1-is-pattern
34    imp-is-pattern imp-is-pattern
35    ph1-is-pattern ph1-is-pattern
36    imp-is-pattern imp-is-pattern
37    ph1-is-pattern ph1-is-pattern
38    ph1-is-pattern imp-is-pattern
39    ph1-is-pattern axiom-2
40    ph1-is-pattern ph1-is-pattern
41    ph1-is-pattern imp-is-pattern
42    axiom-1 rule-mp ph1-is-pattern
43    ph1-is-pattern axiom-1 rule-mp
44  $.
```

Claims with proofs
(machine checked)

We re-implemented MetaMath:

- In RiskZero's Rust fragment
- Then generate recursive STARK
- Collaboration with RiskZero (Tim Carstens) and Univ. of Illinois (Andrew Miller + Grigore Rosu)



More General, Universal, yet Smaller Circuit (than Language-Specific Solutions)


zkEVM vs zk[K[EVM]]

Only Execution Claims: φ

Trust me, zkEVM is a correct implementation of some (hypothetical) EVM formal semantics!



zkEVM is just one example, but Cairo, zkVM of RiskZero, zkLLVM of =nil;, etc., suffer from the same problem



30k to 1.5M+ LOC

crypto proof: π_φ

Any Claim: φ




Formal semantics of EVM, ideally on the blockchain and vetted by some organization.

~240 LOC

crypto proof: π_φ



Plug-and-Play any language instead of EVM.



SNARK-ed simple matching logic proof checker. Same for all languages and claims!




Coming Products (2023-2024)

2023 Product: K Prover as a Service (KaaS)




Pre-deployment recurrent revenue



2023 Product: K Prover as a Service (KaaS)



Pre-deployment recurrent revenue



2023 Product: Invariant Monitoring & Recovery

Post-deployment recurrent revenue

Major outcome of formal verification audits: **specifications / invariants**

So we got the most difficult component of runtime monitoring ... for free !

Monitoring services alone, without recovery



Inform clients of the health status of their protocol



Inform keepers (arbitrators, liquidators) of opportunities

Monitoring services with recovery




Maintain runtime integrity of protocol

- E.g. invariant “loans are 80% collateralized” does not hold without liquidations




Be keepers ourselves


2024 Product: Proof (of Proof) Certificates



2024 Product: Proof (of Proof) Certificates



2024 Product: Proof (of Proof) Certificates



K Advantage: multi-chain, multi-language audits / tools / proofs

RV's core technology platform, dedicated blockchain teams and automated verification tools allow us to quickly and efficiently add new chain and language support based on market demand. So far:

 Algorand™



CØSMOS

elrond

 ethereum

Polkadot.

 SOLANA

 STARKWARE

 Tezos

C
C++
Cairo
Haskell
Ligo
Michelson
Plutus
Reach
Rust
Solidity / EVM
Teal
WASM

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